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    講座:Level-k Analysis of a Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information and Uncertainty: An experimental study

    發布者:經濟系    發布時間:2021-05-26

    題 目:Level-k Analysis of a Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information and Uncertainty: An experimental study

    嘉 賓:徐智博 博士后 深圳大學微眾金融科技學院

    主持人:胥莉 副教授 上海交通大學安泰經濟與管理學院

    時 間:202162日(周三)14:30-16:00

    地 點:上海交通大學 徐匯校區安泰樓A507

    內容簡介:

    This paper presents an experiment designed to study how people play a two-person two-stage dynamic game with incomplete information and uncertainty, a strictly competitive game related to real-world Casino games (Blackjack and Texas hold’em Poker), and to study the effect of different experimental description methods on strategic behaviours. To identify players’ strategic sophistication, a Bayes level-k analysis is introduced. The experimental data shows that around half of the subjects are strategic players and the Bayes level-k thinking dominates in strategic behaviours. Furthermore, the comparison between the direct-response description and the strategy-method description implies that subjects in the strategy-method description play less strategic behaviours.

    演講人簡介:

    Xu, Zhibo is the Post-Doc research fellow in the ShenZhen University WeBank Institute of FinTech. She received his Ph.D. in 2019 from the university of St Andrews and worked as Post-Doc research fellow at Marketing Department of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (2019-2020). Her research interests are in experimental economics, behavioral economics, and decision making in dynamic games. 

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