講座：When does Competition and Costly Information Acquisition Lead to a Deadlock?
題 目：When does Competition and Costly Information Acquisition Lead to a Deadlock?
嘉 賓：魯家琦, Ph.D. candidate, Columbia Business School
主持人：李成璋 助理教授 上海交通大學
時 間：2020年12月22日（周二） 14:00-15:30
地 點：上海交通大學 徐匯校區包圖A407
We study a matching market with N agents who compete over M = αN opportunities. Agents must perform a costly inspection to verify compatibility prior to matching, and are willing to inspect their current favorite opportunity only if, should they find it compatible, they will be guaranteed a match. We ask when, in large random markets, will information deadlocks arise, i.e., in which markets will a constant fraction of agents get stuck waiting for a guaranteed inspection to become available. We prove, using the machinery of message passing and density evolution from statistical physics, that the existence of an information deadlock is governed by the opportunity to agent ratio α. Numerical evidence shows a phase transition from the information deadlock regime to a deadlock-free regime (where a vanishingly small fraction of agents are stuck waiting) as we gradually increase α.
Jiaqi Lu is a Ph.D. candidate (2015 – 2021 expected) in the Decision, Risk, and Operations division at Columbia Business School, where she is advised by Yash Kanoria and Awi Federgruen. Her research uses stochastic modeling, optimization, and novel tools from statistical physics to address complex operational problems in businesses and society. Specific directions include the analysis and design of large matching markets, supply chain management, and customer relationship management. Prior to her Ph.D., she obtained B.E. in Industrial Engineering and B.A. in English at Tsinghua University in 2013. After that, she obtained M.S. in Management Science and Engineering at Columbia University in 2015. Jiaqi is currently on the job market.